Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. - White Ghetto Tenants - Standing to Protest Landlord\u27s Rental Discrimination by Chiara, Rosalee
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1973
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. - White
Ghetto Tenants - Standing to Protest Landlord's
Rental Discrimination
Rosalee Chiara
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate
Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Case Comment, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. - White Ghetto Tenants - Standing to Protest Landlord's Rental
Discrimination, 22 Clev. St. L. Rev. 359 (1973)
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
White Ghetto Tenants - Standing to Protest
Landlord's Rental Discrimination
3 HE SUPREME COURT in Trafficante v. Metropolitan life Insurance
Co.' has held that tenants having standing under Tile VIII of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §3610(a), 2 §3610(d) 3 and 42
U.S.C. §19824 to sue their landlord for its alleged discriminatory
rental practices. 5 Plaintiffs, one black and one white, were tenants
of an apartment complex in San Francisco whose tenant popula-
tion of approximately 8,200 people was less than one percent black.'
The complaint alleged a variety of discriminatory rental practices
directed toward non-white rental applicants7 and stated that plain-
tiffs had been injured in three respects. They claimed that they had
lost the social benefits of living in an integrated community; that
they had missed business and professional advantages which would
have accrued if they had lived with members of minority groups;
and that they had suffered embarrassment and economic damage by
being classed as residents of a white ghetto.6
The district court in its opinion granted defendants' motion
to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs were not "persons aggrieved"
under 42 U.S.C. 3610(a) and had no standing to sue under 42 U.S.C.
§3612 or 42 U.S.C. §1982.10
1409 U.S. 205 (1972).
242 U.S.C. §3610(a) (1970). This section reads in part as fellows:
Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice
or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing
practice that is about to occur (hereafter "person aggrieved") may file a complaint
with the Secretary.
342 U.S.C. §3610(d) (1970). This section reads in part as follows:
If within thirty days after a complaint is filed with the secretary . . . the secre
tary has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this subchapter, the
person aggrieved may, within thirty days thereafter, commence a civil action in
any appropriate United States district cour  against the respondent named in the
complaint to enforce the rights granted or protected by this subchapter insofar
as such rights relate to the subject of the complaint....
442 U.S.C. §1982(1970). This section reads as follows:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every state and
territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property....
'409 U.S. 205. 206 (1972).
6 Id, at 208.
'Txafficante v. Metropolitan Life Inc. Co., 322 F.Supp. 352 (ND. Cal. 1971).
'l1d. at 353. 42 U.S.C. §3610 defines "'person(s) aggrieved" as "any person who claims to
have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice."
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The enforcement of the public interest in fair housing
enunciated in Title VIII of the Act and the creation of
integrated communities to the extent envisioned by Congress
are entrusted to the Attorney General by sec. 810, 42 U.S.C.
3613, and not to private litigants such as those before the
court."
The court went on to say that the "private attorneys general"12
cases cited by the plaintiffs applied to situations involving the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act or government agencies and not to ac-
tivities of private individuals such as these plaintiffs. 3
In affirming the district court, the 9th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals 4 in an extensive examination of statutory construction, legis-
lative intent, and congressional policy concluded that plaintiffs had
no standing under 42 U.S.C. §3610(a), 42 U.S.C. §3610, or 42 U.S.C.
§1982.1" The court of appeals examined the complaint in light of the
test for standing as enunciated in Data Processing Service Organ-
ization v. Camp' 6 and directed its attention to the requirement that
the interest to be protected come within the zone of interests to be
protected by the statute. The other requirement, that there be in-
jury in fact,7 was not discussed.
The court of appeals in Trafficante stated that the plaintiffs
made no allegations that they themselves were the direct objects of
discrimination but that their injury arose from the "pattern or
practice" of discrimination by their landlord. 8 In concluding that
this interest or injury did not fall within the protection of Title VIII
of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, the opinion continued,
Construing the provisions of Title VIII as a whole, it seems
clear that it was the intent of Congress to provide first,
through sec. 3610 and 3612 methods of redress for persons
who are the objects of discriminatory housing practices and
who seek to vindicate rights granted . . . and second, to
grant to the Attorney General the right to sue to correct "pat-
terns and practices" of discrimination .... We find nothing
1 Id.
12 "Private attorney generals" are private citizens suing to vindicate the public interest. See
Associated Indus. of N.Y. v. Ickes, 134 F,2d 694 (2d Cit. 1943).
13 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F.Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
1 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cit. 1971).
15M. at 1163-64.
16397 U.S. 150 (1970).
171d, at 152. In order for a party seeking judicial review to meet the "injury in fact" require-
ment, such party must himself have suffered an injury. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972).
"s446 F.2d 115B, 1162 (9th Cir, 1971).
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in the Congressional discussion or debate to suggest that
Congress intended to grant standing to sue to any private
persons other than the direct victims of discriminatory
housing practices proscribed by the act. 9
The rights protected under 42 U.S.C. §1982 include the right
to purchase or lease property and the freedom from racially moti-
vated interference with such rights. 0 The court of appeals further
stated that the injuries alleged by plaintiff were not related to these
rights and thus plaintiffs had no standing to sue under this statute.
21
The decision of the district court was therefore affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts
and held that plaintiffs did have standing to redress the type of
injuries they had suffered. The right to sue given to "persons ag-
grieved" in Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act was construed
to extend to tenants of an apartment complex using discriminatory
rental practices and these tenants' alleged injuries were sufficient
to afford them standing.23
The most recent tests used to determine standing were an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Data Processing Service Organ-
izations, Inc. v. Ccap 4 There the petitioner sold data processing
services to businesses in general and sought to challenge a ruling
by the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national banks to make
data processing available to other banks and customers.25 The case
was dismissed in the lower courts because the petitioner was held
not to have standing.2' The Supreme Court, in its reversal, 27 stated
that standing had to be considered within the framework of the
"case and controversy" requirement of the Constitution 28 and that two
tests must be met. The plaintiff first must allege injury in fact and
second must demonstrate that the interest he is seeking to protect
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the Constitutional or statutory provision involved." The Court
commented on the second test by saying,
" Id. at 1162-63.
2042 U.S.C. §1982 (1970).
21446 F.2d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 1971).
-409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
3Id.
-4397 U.S. 150 (1970).
2Sld. at 151.
26 Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 279 F.Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968).
7397 U.S. 110 (1970).
t2Id. at 151.
2 Id. at 158.
19731
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Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlarge-
ment of the class of people who may protest administrative
action. The whole drive for enlarging the category of 'ag-
grieved persons' is symtomatic to the trend.30
In Sierra Club v. Morton,31 the Court again recognized that the
category of injuries sufficient to allow standing is being enlarged,32
but insisted that the requirement of injury in fact to the individual
seeking review was nevertheless mandatory.2
But broadening the categories of injury that may be
alleged in support of standing is a different matter from
abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review
must himself have suffered an injury.Y
There the Sierra Club, in its position as an environmental pro-
tection group, sought relief under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 35 to halt the proposed construction of a ski resort in a wilder-
ness area of California." The Sierra Club did not allege that its
members would be personally affected or that they made any use of
the area. The injury alleged was that caused by the change in the
use of the land and the ecological destruction that would necessarily
occur;37 an injury suffered by citizens in general.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, felt that this type
of injury could very well be protected by the statute in question
thus fulfilling one part of the Data Processing Service Organiza-
tion, Inc. v. Camp test.38 It continued,
But the "injury in fact" test requires more than an injury
to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking
review be himself among the injured. 3'
The Sierra Club did not allege sufficiently individualized injury to
allow it to have standing as a "person aggrieved."4 It did not state
that its use of the area as an organization would be significantly
interfered with by the construction of the resort.4 1 The Supreme
30 Id.
" Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
32Id. at 730.
31 Id. at 740.
1 Id. at 738.
355 U.S.C. §701 et seq., as amended 5 U.S.C. §2251 (1964).
3"405 U.S. 727, 730 (1972).
"Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 33 (9th Cir. 1970).
-405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
"Id. at 734-35
41 d. at 735.
41 Id.
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Court in reversing the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of
the district court. The conclusion that the majority opinion in that
case was based on the Sierra Club's insufficiently individualized
allegations of injury is reinforced by Justice Blackmun in his dis-
sent. He argued as one alternative that the club should be allowed
to amend its pleadings as a condition for reversal of the court of
appeals and that the merits should be considered at once after such
amendment.4 2
Trafficante is distinguishable from Sierra Club v. Morton in that
it examines the second requirement in the test for standing, namely
that the interest sought to be protected by the complaint is arguably
within the zone of interests protected by the statute. In this respect
Trafficante is similar to Office of Communication of United Church
of Christ v. FCC,43 where the court of appeals granted standing to a
representative organization to challenge the grant of a television
license by the FCC." There the court assumed that there was in
fact injury to the listening audience and its main emphasis was on
the fact that such injury was recognizable and should be protected
in order to effectuate the purposes of the FCC. 5
Unless the listeners, the broadcast consumers, can be heard
there may be no one to bring programming deficiencies or
offensive overcommercialization to the attention of the Com-
mission in an effective manner. By process of elimination
those "consumers" willing to shoulder the burdensome and
costly process of intervention in a commission proceeding
are likely to be the only ones 'having a sufficient interest'
to challenge a renewal application."
Justice Douglas in Traffleante expressed the same concern with
regard to fair housing legislation by holding that the plaintiffs' al-
legations of injury resulting from living in a segregated community
were sufficient to demonstrate injury in fact,
Injury is alleged with particularity so there is not present
the abstract question raising problems under Art. III of
the Constitution. The person on the landlord's blacklist is
not the only victim of discriminatory housing practices ...
42 Id.
43Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cit.
1966).
id. at 1003-04.
4Id. at 1005.
46Id.
47409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
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The Trafficante opinion directs most of its attention to the ques-
tion of whether or not this actual injury is an interest to be pro-
tected by the statutes involved.4' It comes to a conclusion opposite
that of the court of appeals and states that the definition of "persons
aggrieved" contained in 42 U.S.C. §3610(a) et seq., "any person
who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing prac-
tice," is in its terms broad.49 That such defined individual may bring
suit in federal court is read to indicate that complaints by private
persons are a necessary enforcement process of the Act. 0 The prin-
cipal decision cites Hackett v. MeGuire Bros., Inc.51 which held
that the definition of "persons aggrieved" in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 should be broadly construed to avoid frustration of the
policy of the Act by development of an overly technical doctrine of
standing.52 Justice Douglas reaches the same conclusion with respect
to the 1968 Civil Rights Act "insofar as tenants of the same housing
unit that is charged with discrimination are concerned." 3
He continues by examining legislative history and discussion
surrounding the statutes and admits that such examination is not
helpful. 4 The references to the Congressional Record at this point
in the opinion do not discuss the scope of the 'persons aggrieved"
provision, and at best, can be said neither to encourage nor preclude
a broad definition. 5
The opinion then considers the construction given the Act by
officials of HUD and finds that injuries suffered by plaintiffs here
are sufficient, in that agency's opinion, to bring the complaints with
the jurisdiction of the Act. This finding is given great weight and
is consistent with previous cases decided by the Court where
the Court's interpretation of the statutes followed the statutory in-
terpretation of the agency entrusted with the enforcement of those
specific statutes s7 Thus the design and function of the Act itself
leads to the conclusion that private enforcement is necessary,
Since HUD had no enforcement powers and since the enor-
mity of the task of assuring fair housing makes the role
of the Attorney General in the matter minimal, the main
49Id.
191d. at 209.
50 Id.
s, Hackett v. McGuire Bros. Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3rd Cir. 1971).
'
21 d. at 446-47.
534 0 9 US. 205, 209 (1972).
5Id.
55 Id.
56 Jd,
s
TSee Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1970); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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generating force must be private suits in which, the Solicitor
General says, the complainants act not on their own behalf
but also as "private attorney generals" in vindicating a
policy that Congress considered to be of the highest
priority.58
Typical of cases cited by Mr. Justice Douglas to emphasize the
increasing importance of private suits in the enforcement of modern
legislative programs is Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.5'
There the Supreme Court was considering the provision for at-
torney's fees for private litigation brought under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. It determined that when the Civil Rights Act was
passed it was evident that it would be difficult to enforce and that
the nation would have to rely on private litigants to assure com-
pliance; that it was the congressional purpose to encourage litigation
to stop discrimination." It is clear that the Traficante Court recog-
nized that private enforcement serves the same important role with
respect to the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
".. . in protecting not only those against whom a dis-
crimination is directed but also those whose complaint is
that the manner of managing a housing projects affects
"the very quality of their daily lives."61
Thus the interest of tenants in protesting the discriminatory
practices of their landlord is one which was held to be protected by
the 1968 Civil Rights Act. This coupled with the factual and in-
dividualized injuries alleged by the plaintiffs was sufficient to grant
them standing and the case was reversed and remanded to the dis-
trict court for discussion of the merits.
In a separate concurrence written by Justice White and joined
by Justices Blackmun and Powell, an attempt was made to limit
concurrence to the statutory language involved:
But with that statute purporting to give all those author-
ized to complain to the agency the right also to sue in court,
I would sustain the statute insofar as it extends standing
to those in the position of the petitioners in this case.62
f4 09 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
s' Ncwman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
60 Id. at 401.
61409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
62409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
1973]
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Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. does not affect
the basic standing requirement that there must be individual injury
to those seeking review and so is consistent with Sierra Club v.
Morton. Trafficante does, however, expand the concept of standing
to the extent that it recognizes the rights of tenants, black or white,
to live in an integrated community. The Court declares that this
right, hitherto unrecognized, is an interest protected under the 1968
Civil Rights Act, and that such tenants, if individually injured, are
entitled to access to the courts to redress such injuries.
Rosalee Chiarat
f Law Review candidate; second-year student, Cleveland State University College of Law.
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